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FUNCTIONS AND WAGE EQUATIONS
ABSTRACT
We use a unique new data set that combines individual worker data with data on workers’
employers to estimate plant-level production functions and wage equations, and thus to compare
relative marginal products and relative wages for various groups of workers. The data and
empirical framework lead to new evidence on numerous questions regarding the determination
of wages, questions that hinge on the relationship between wages and marginal products of
workers in different demographic groups. These include race and sex discrimination in wages,
the causes of rising wages over the life cycle, and the returns to marriage. First, workers who
have ever been married are more productive than never-married workers and are paid
accordingly. Second, prime-aged workers (aged 35-54) are equally as productive as younger
workers, and in some specifications are estimated to receive higher wages. However, older
workers (aged 55+) are less productive than younger workers but are paid more. Third, the data
indicate no difference between the relative wage and relative productivity of black workers.
Finally, with the exception of managerial and professional occupations, women are paid about
25-35% less than men, but estimated productivity differentials for women are generally no larger
than 1570, and significantly smaller than the pay differential.
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and NBERI. Introduction
Competing models of wage determination hinge on the relationships between wages,
productivity, and worker characteristics. However, direct measures of worker productivity are hard
to obtain, so economists usually rely on proxies for productivity when conducting empirical research.
The difficulty with this approach is that whether these proxies reflect productivity is always in doubt,
making it difficult to distinguish between competing models.
This lack of data on worker productivity plagues numerous areas of empirical research related
to issues of wage determination. For example, with data only on wages and worker characteristics
over the life cycle, it is difficult to distinguish human capital models of wage growth (such as Ben-
Porath, 1967; Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1974) from incentive-compatible models of wage growth
(Lazear, 1979) or forced-saving models of life-cycle wage profiles (Loewenstein and Sicherrnan,
1991; Frank and Hutchens, 1993). Typical wage regression results report positive coefficients on
age, conditional on a variety of covariates, but these positive coefficients neither imply that older
workers are more productive than younger ones, nor that wages rise faster than productivity.
Similarly, without direct measures of the relative productivities of workers, discrimination by sex,
race, or marital status cannot be established based on significant negative estimated coefficients on
female or black dummy variables, or positive estimated coefficients on a married dummy variable, in
standard wage regressions, since the usual individual-level wage regression controls may not fully
capture productivity differences (e.g., Becker, 1985).
To overcome these difficulties, we use a unique new data set that combines individual worker
data with data on workers’ employers to estimate and compare relative marginal products and relative
wages for various groups of workers, This employer-employee data set, the Worker Establishment
Characteristics Database (WECD), matches long-form respondents to the 1990 Decennial Census to
data on their employers from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). These data are a major
1improvement over previously available data sources because they combine detailed demographic
information on workers in a sample of plants with information on plant-level inputs, outputs, and
labor costs. ]
We use these data to estimate production finctions in which workers with different
characteristics are perfectly substitutable labor inputs with potentially different marginal products,
and plant-level earnings equations which represent the aggregation of individual-level regressions
over workers employed in a plant. The estimates of these equations allow us to compare the
relative marginal productivities and relative wages of workers distinguished by various
demographic characteristics .2’3 Thus, the data and empirical framework lead to new evidence on
numerous topics regarding the determination of wages, including race and sex discrimination in
wages, the causes of rising wages over the life cycle, and the returns to marriage.
II. The Relationship) BeWeen Wapes and Productivity
IL1 The Null HvDothesis
In order to motivate the approach we take in this paper, we first present the simplest model
illustrating the relationship between wages and productivity under perfect competition. Consider an
‘However, they are somewhat limited in that they are only cross-sectional, ordy cover the manufacturing sector, and
are weighted toward large plants.
‘The WECD is a very rich and useful data set, and has so far been utilized only in a few other studies (Troske, 1994;
Barrington and Troske, 1994). There are clearly many important issues which these data maybe able to address; we limit
this paper solely to the analysis of the relationship between the productivity and wage differentials among workers with
different demographic characteristics.
‘This paper builds on the framework used in Hellerstein and Neumark (1994 and 1995, hereafter HNa and HNb) to
analyze Israeli manufacturing data (although the WECD offers numerous advantages over the Israeli data), and it
represents a departure from most of the existing empirical literature on wage determination. As discussed in HNa and
HNb, there is little existing research comparing productivity and wage data, and even less using firm-level data. Brown
and Medoff (1978) estimate a production function using state-by-industry level data to test whether the union wage
premium is associated with higher productivity of union labor. Leonard (1984) uses similar data over time to examine the
impact of affirmative action laws on productivity in the U.S. One firm-level productivity and wage study examines
evidence of sex discrimination using data from the nineteenth-century French textile industry (Cox and Nye, 1989).
Studies applied to more narrowly-defined industries have been pursued in the union literature (Allen, 1984; Clark, 1980).
Other research has used proxies for productivity, including using piece-rate pay to measure productivity in time-rate work
(Foster and Rosenzweig, 1993) and performance ratings (Holzer, 1990; Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Medoff and
Abraham, 1980).
2economy consisting of plants that produce output Ywith a technology that utilizes two different types
of perfectly substitutable labor inputs, L1 and L2. The production fanction of these plants is
(1) Y=F(L, + $L2),
where @is the marginal productivity of L2 relative to L,. These plants are assumed to operate in
perfectly competitive spot labor markets, and labor supply is assumed to be completely inelastic. The
price of the output Yis normalized to equal one. Wages of workers of types L, and L2 are w, and W2,
respectively. Define the relative wage rate (w2/wl) to be A. Given this setup, the proportional mix of
the two types of labor in each plant will be determined by the relationship between $ and A. If $=A,
then under profit maximization or cost minimization plants will be indifferent to the proportional mix
of the two types of labor in the plant. If there is a wedge between the relative marginal product and
relative wage so that @+A, then profit-maximizing or cost-minimizing plants will be at a comer
solution, hiring either only workers of type L, (if $<A) or only workers of type L2 (if $> A). The only
equilibrium in this model is when wages adjust so that $=1, and plants are indifferent between the
two types of labor.
Evidence that $#A is inconsistent with the assumption that we are observing profit-
maximizing or cost-minimizing plants in a competitive spot labor market.4 This paper can be
interpreted as providing empirical tests of this characterization of labor markets. We estimate
variants of the plant-level production tiction in equation (1) simultaneously with plant-level wage
equations in order to obtain estimates of $ and Afor various types of workers. We interpret cases
where we cannot reject the equality of $ and k as evidence consistent with competitive spot labor
markets. Cases in which we reject the equality of@ and Aindicate some deviation from this
characterization of labor markets, such as long-term incentive contracts or discrimination.
4Labor supply could be less than completely inelastic; as long as market wages remain above reservation wages, the
conclusions are unchanged.
3112 An Alternative Hvuothesis: Discrimination
One such deviation that receives a lot of attention in this paper is labor market discrimination.
If there is employer discrimination against L2labor, as in Becker(197 1), then employers maximize
utility defined as
(2) U(n,L,,L2) = F(L1 + $L2) - w,L, - W2L2- d.L2,
where d is the discrimination coefficient capturing an employer’s distaste for L2. In this case utility
maximization implies
(3) $ = A+ dlw,
implying that $>A.
If d varies across employers, this case presents the problem that many firms should be at
corner solutions. Faced with the market wage ratio A, firms will hire only L2 if d < $MP1 - Wz,and
only L] if d > @MP1- W2. We do not appear to observe this type of segmentation in hiring. However,
this predicted segmentation is a result of the particular specification of employers’ discriminatory
tastes. An alternative, considered in Neumark (1988), is
(4) U(n,L,,L2) = F(L, + $L,) - w,L, - W2L2 - d.[L2/L,].
In this case, employers care about the relative level of L2, rather than the absolute level. With
this utility fmction, maximization of (4) implies
(5) $ = [w,+(d/L, )]/[w,-(d.L2/L,2)].
In this case the marginal disutility from an additional unit of L2 labor is not fixed, but depends
on the relative level of L2. Thus, even if d varies across employers, employers facing the same Awill
hire both L, and L2 labor. Of course, those with a higher value of d will hire less L2 and more Ll, as
equation (5) shows. Thus, the simple employer discrimination model with heterogeneity in
4discriminatory tastes does not preclude all (or most) firms hiring both types of labor, even though
they face the same wage ratio.5
III. A Structural Production Function ADDroach
To estimate parameters corresponding to $--the relative marginal productivities of various
types of labor--we estimate a translog production finction in which the value of output Yis a
finction of capital K, materials M, and a quality of labor aggregate QL.6 In logs, this is
(6) ln(~ = In(A) + aln(K) + ~ln(M) + yln :( K, M,QL) p,
where g(K,M,QL) is the second-order terms in the production function (Jorgenson, et al., 1973), and
p is an error term.
For each plant in our data set, we have demographic information on a sample of their
workforce from the WECD. We assume that in the quality of labor aggregate QL, workers with
different demographic characteristics are perfectly substitutable inputs with potentially different
marginal products.7 For example, assume that workers are distinguished only by sex. Then QL
would be defined as
(7) QL L(I ($F-l);),
where L is the total number of workers in the plant, F is the number of women in the plant, and $~ is
the marginal productivity of women relative to men. Substituting equation (7) into equation (6), we
5Another well-known objection to this model is that employers with discriminatory tastes against a particular group
cannot survive in a competitive marketplace (Becker, 1971), However, Goldberg (1982) shows that we can frame the
model in terms of nepotism toward type L, labor rather than discrimination against Lj, in which case the results are
qualitatively the same, but discrimination (actually, nepotism) will not be competed away.
6Theresults reported in the paper were very similar when a Cobb-Douglas production function was used. The only
noteworthy difference is that the evidence consistent with sex discrimination was stronger.
‘Issues relating to this specification of the labor input are discussed in Rosen (1983). Below, we report some estimates
dropping the perfect substitutes assumption.
5obtain a production function with which we can estimate $~, using plant-level data on output, capital
and materials inputs, and data on the number of workers and the sex composition of the workforce.
We actually define QL to assume that workers are distinguished not only by sex but also by:
race (black and non-black); marital status (ever married); age (divided into three broad categories--
under 35, 35-54, 55 and over); education (defined as having attended at least some college); and
occupation (divided into four groups--(l) operators, fabricators, and laborers (unskilled production
workers), (2) managers and professionals, (3) technical, sales, administrative, and service, and (4)
precision production, craft, and repair), A firm’s workforce can then be fally described by the
proportions of workers in each of 192 possible combinations of demographic groups.
To reduce the dimensionality of the problem, for much of our work we impose two
restrictions on the form of QL. First, we restrict the relative marginal products of two types of
workers within one demographic group to be equal to the relative marginal products of those same
two types of workers within another demographic group. For example, the relative productivity of
black women to black men is restricted to equal the relative marginal productivity of otherwise
identical non-black women to non-black men. Similarly, the race difference in marginal productivity
is restricted to be the same across the sexes. Second, we restrict the proportion of workers in an
establishment defined by a demographic group to be constant across all other groups; for example,
we restrict blacks to be equally represented in all occupations, education levels, marital status groups,
etc. We impose these restrictions due to data limitations. For each establishment, we do not have
data on the actual number of workers in each of the 192 possible combinations of demographic
characteristics, but instead estimate that number using our sample of workers matched to the plant. It
is likely, therefore, that we cannot obtain accurate estimates of the representation of workers in
narrowly defined sets of demographic groups. For example, in many plants there are no workers in
our sample in some of the demographic groups, even though it is likely that there are, in fact, some
6workers in these groups. Our restrictions on QL reduce the number of sample estimates based on
small numbers of workers, as well as the number of parameters. The effects of relaxing these
restrictions on QL are considered in the empirical results below. To foreshadow the results, relaxing
the equiproportionate assumption with regard to the distribution of workers, even in cases in which it
is least likely to hold (such as the distribution of men and women across occupations) has relatively
minor consequences for the results.
With these assumptions, the quality of labor term in the production function becomes
QL = yln[(L+(@F-l)F) (l+(@B-l)~)(l +($R-l)~(l +(@G-l)fi
(8)
(l+(@, -l); +(@o-l);(l +(@N-l):+(@,-l) ;+(@c-l)~],
where B is the number of black workers, R is the number of workers ever married, G is the number of
workers who have some college education, P is the number of workers in the plant between the ages
of35 and 54, 0 is the number of workers who are 55 or older, and N, S, and C are the numbers of
workers in the second through fourth occupational categories defined above.8 Note that the way QL
aFor example, suppose workers are distinguished by race and sex. Then the unrestricted quality of labor term is
QL = L + ($F-l)WF + (@B-l)BM + ($F$B”$FXB-l)BF ,
where W is the number of white females, BM the number of black males, and BF the number of black females. The
restriction of equal relative marginal productivities implies o~x~ = 1. The equiproportionate distribution restriction
implies BF = B“(F/L), BF = B( 1-(F/L)), and W = F(I -(B/L)). Substituting, we obtain
QL = L + ($F-l)F(l -(B/L)) + (@B-l)B(l -(F/L)) + ($F$B@FxB-l)B(FIL) ,
which reduces to
QL = (L + (@F-l)F)(l + (@, -l)(B/L)) ,
7is defined, productivity differentials between groups are indicated when the estimate of the relevant @
is significantly different from one (rather than zero). For example, a finding of $~ = 1.3 would imply
that ever-married workers are 30V0more productive than never-man-ied workers.9
We also allow productivity to vary by size of plant (see Lucas, 1978; Baily, et al., 1992),
industry, region, age of plant, and whether or not the plant is part of a multi-plant firm, by adding
controls for these plant-level characteristics to the production function.’0
Because materials are likely to be an endogenous input, when we estimate the production
function with output as the dependent variable, we instrument for materials with lagged materials.t 1
If plants differ systematically (i.e., in a persistent manner) in terms of output, and the differences are
correlated with materials, then lagged materials is not a valid instrument. However, if the output
differences over time are due to uncorrelated period-specific effects, then a lagged value of materials
is a valid instrument.
paralleling equation (8).
91nthe text of the paper, we sometimes report the estimate of $, and whether it is significantly different from one, and
sometimes refer to the implied percentage differential (@- 1), and whether it is statistically significant (i.e., significantly
different from zero). The tables report estimates of the $’s.
‘OAs Griliches andRingstad(1971) point out, estimates of the fust-order terms in the translog production function are
not invariant to the units of the data. We therefore de-mean the (log ofi capital, materials, and labor quality inputs prior
to estimating the production function, so that the coefficients on the productive inputs in the production function are
estimated at the mean of the sample. Following Crepon and Mairesse (1993), we de-mean the log quality of labor term,
ln(QL), by first estimating the translog production function without demeaning, constructing plant-level estimates of
ln(QL), and then taking the mean over the sample of the estimated values of ln(QL). This allows us to measure the returns
to scale parameter by adding up the coefficients on the linear terms.
1‘To instrument for materials, we form the predicted value of log materials, form the nonlinear variables involving
materials using this predicted value, and use the latter as instruments (Bowden and Turkington, 1984). We are most
worried about the endogeneity of materials, given that materials inputs are the easiest for firms to adjust in the short-run.
Nonetheless, it is possible that capital and labor quality are also endogenous. We unfortunately do not have good
instruments for these latter two inputs. First, as we discuss below, the capital measure we use in the production function
is actually a measure of lagged book value of capital. Second, the data on the demographic composition of workers in a
plant is cross-sectional data, so we have no lagged measures of worker quality, nor do we have any other good candidates
for instruments. To the extent that these problems affect the coefficients in the wage and productivity equations similarly,
our test for the differences between relative wages and productivities should be unaffected, In Section VIII we return to
this issue in the context of omitted variable bias in the production finction.
8We also estimate a value-added version of the production fi_mction,using /n~-M) as the
dependent variable. Griliches mdWngstad (1971)list nmerous justifications forthe value-added
specification. First, materials may be a particularly endogenous input, and the value-added
specification avoids estimating a coefficient on materials. Second, the value-added specification
enhances comparability of data across industries and across establishments within industries, when
industries or establishments differ in their degree of vertical integration. Third, the value-added
specification can be derived from quite polar production finction specifications: one in which the
elasticity of substitution between materials and value added is infinite (i.e., Y= f(K,QL)+~; and one
in which this elasticity of substitution is zero (so that materials have to be used in a fixed proportion
to output).
IV. Earninps Differentials Amonp Workers
We have three compensation measures available in our data set: the plant’s total annual wage
and salary bill; the plant’s total annual wage and salary bill plus expenditures on non-wage
compensation; and an estimate of the plant’s total annual wage and salary bill derived from our
sample of workers matched to the establishment. For simplicity, in the following discussion we refer
to each of these measures as the plant’s total wages. We examine results with each of the
compensation measures.
The plant-level wage equation we estimate for most of the results retains the
equiproportionate distribution restriction made in defining QL in the production function. We also
(again paralleling the production fiction) restrict the relative wages of workers within a
demographic group to be constant across all other demographic groups. Furthermore, we assume that
all workers within each unique set of demographic groupings are paid the same amount, up to a
multiplicative random error. Then total log wages in a plant can be written as
9in(w)= a’ + ln[(L+(AF-l)F)( l+(AB-l)~)(l +(AR-l) ~(l+(AG-l)~
(9)
(l+(A, -l) E+(Ao-l)Q)(l +(AN-l) !+(a~-l); +(Ac-l)}] + E,
L L L
where a‘ is the log wage of the reference group (non-black, never married, male, no college, young,
unskilled production worker) and the 1 terms represent the relative wage differentials associated with
each characteristic.
This plant-level equation can be interpreted as the aggregation over workers in the plant of
the individual-level wage equation. To show this, consider a simpler version of the wage equation
involving only men and women. The total wage bill in levels implied by equation (9) is
(10) w = w~(L-~ + w,F,
where w~ and w~ are the average wages of men and women. This can be rewritten as
w = w~(L-fl + A~wMF= WM(~ + (A~-1)~,
which in logs is
in w = a’+ ln(L + (A,-l)m,
as in equation (9), where a’= ln(w~).
Next, consider the individual-level wage equation in levels
(11) Wi =WMMi+W~Fi,
where M, and Fi are dummy variables for men and women, respectively. Clearly, the aggregation of
this equation over all workers in the plant yields equation (10), from which, as we have shown, the
wage equation (9) can be derived.
We interpret equation (9) not as a behavioral equation but simply a definitional one. It
assumes that all plants are wage takers in a competitive labor market so that wages do not vary
10systematically across plants. 12 In order to relax this assumption somewhat, in the empirical analysis
we allow wages to vary systematically with industry, plant size, region, and age of the plant. 13In
addition, we include as regressors in the wage equation the capital and materials expenditures of the
plant. These inputs in the wage equation may account for the possibility that capital and materials are
proxies for unobserved ability of workers, possibly because of complementarities between capital and
unobserved dimensions of skill (Griliches, 1970), or they may be proxies for other differences across
plants that shifi wages.
We estimate equation (9) jointly with equation (6). We then compare estimates of the k’s
with the corresponding estimates of the $’s from the production function, and test whether the
relative wages of workers with different demographic characteristics are significantly different from
their relative marginal products.
V. The Data
The WECD, constructed at the U.S. Census Bureau, links information for a subset of
individuals responding to the long form of the 1990 Decennial Census with information about their
employers in the 1989 LRD. Long-form Census respondents report the location of their employer in
the prior week, and the type of business or industry in which they work. The Census Bureau then
assigns a code for the location of the employer, corresponding to a unique city block for densely
populated areas, or corresponding to a unique place for sparsely populated areas. The Census Bureau
also classifies workers into industries using Census industry codes so that, in effect, respondents can
be assigned to a unique industry-location cell. The Census Bureau also maintains a complete list of
all manufacturing establishments operating in the U.S. in a given year, along with location and
“AS discussed in Section II, this is the correct assumption to make given that we are testing the null hypothesis of
competitive spot labor markets.
“We also estimate the wage equation and production function for various subsets of the data, in which case wage
differentials across workers are not constrained to be equal in all plants.
11industry information for these establishments that is similar to the data available for workers. Thus,
it is also possible to assign all plants in the U.S. to an industry-location cell. The WECD is
constructed by first selecting all manufacturing establishments in operation in 1990 that are unique in
an industry-location cell. Then all workers who are located in the same industry-location cell as a
unique establishment are matched to that establishment. This results in a data set consisting of
199,558 workers matched to 16,144 plants.
To obtain data on a worker’s employer, these data must be matched to the plant-level data in
the LRD. The LRD is a compilation of plant responses to the Annual Survey of Manufacturers
(ASM) and Census of Manufacturers (CM). The CM is conducted in years ending in a two or a
seven, while the ASM in conducted in all other years for a sample of plants. The LRD contains plant
data from every CM since 1963 and every ASM since 1971. Data in the LRD are of the sort typically
used in production finction estimation, such as output, capital stock, materials expenditures, and
number of workers. In addition, the LRD contains information on total salaries and wages and total
non-salary compensation paid by the plant in a given year (McGuckin and Pascoe, 1988).
Since worker earnings and labor force information in the Decennial Census refer to 1989, we
match the worker data to the 1989 plant data in the LRD. Since 1989 is an ASM year, data are only
available for a sample of plants. Furthermore, since plant-level capital stock information is only
available in Census years, we require all plants to be in the LRD in both 1989 and 1987.14 Finally, to
increase the representativeness of the sample of workers in each plant, we require plants in our data
set to have at least 20 employees in 1989 (as reported in the LRD), and at least 5°/0 of their workforce
contained in the WECD. Our final sample contains data on 3,102 plants and 129,606 workers.
Summary statistics for plant-level data are given in Table 1. The average plant has 353 employees,
“Total capital in the plant is measured as the sum of the end-of-year book value of buildings and machinery in
1987, Again, because 1989 is an ASM year, we use materials from 1987 when we instrument for materials in 1989,
since in 1987 materials are available for most firms in the LRD as of 1989.
12and on average 12°/0of a plant’s workforce is matched to the plant.’5
Troske (1993) concludes that workers are matched to their correct plants--based on the match
rate and on high correlations between variables available in the two data sets--with approximately So/O
of workers from the Census long-form represented in the WECD. The matching process does not,
however, yield a representative sample of workers, as non-black, male, married workers are over-
represented in the WECD. Below we discuss some of the implications of this for our empirical
results.
VI. Individual-Level Wage Repressions with the WECD Data
Before turning to the results of the jointly estimated plant-level production function and wage
equations, we report in Table 2 the results of individual-level wage regressions using the wage data
from the WECD. The wage regression results provide a comparison between the WECD data and
standard wage regression results reported elsewhere. More importantly, the plant-level wage
equation is derived as the aggregation of individual-level wage regressions, as explained above.
Thus, comparing results from the plant-level wage equation with those fi-om the individual-level
regressions gives us an informal test of this aggregation, and is also useful in assessing other potential
biases in the plant-level estimates.
The sets of regressors in the first two columns of Table 2 are among those typically found in
wage regressions, and the results are consistent with standard results. The dependent variable in
column (1) is the log hourly wage of the individual, defined as annual earnings divided by the
product of weeks worked in the year and usual hours worked per week. The dependent variable in
the second column is log annual earnings, so the differentials reflect differences in hourly pay as well
‘5 We have no fewer than two workers per plant. Table 1also reports the distribution of plants based on number of
workers matched.
13as hours worked. We focus on results using the annual earnings data because they most closely
parallel the earnings measures available in the LRD.
The estimates display features common to numerous other data sets. There is a significant
wage gap between men and women, and a smaller but still significant wage gap between blacks and
non-blacks. ‘b The estimated life-cycle wage profile has the usual quadratic shape. The positive
marriage premium (of 16°/0)parallels that found elsewhere--t ypicall y for men. Below, we examine
results that let marriage-wage and marriage-productivity differentials vary by sex.
To see how individual-level wage regression estimates are influenced by the addition of
plant-level controls in the WECD, column (3) uses the specification in column (2) but adds the plant-
level covariates of total employment, capital, materials expenditures, and age of the establishment, as
well as individual occupational controls. Adding these variables shrinks the estimated relationship
between earnings and education, particularly for highly-educated workers, consistent with these
controls being correlated with worker quality. Nevertheless, a significant positive relationship is still
present. The estimated coefficients on the other demographic variables (race, sex, age, marital status)
do not change much. As inTroske(1994), including the plant’s capital stock causes the plant-size
wage premium to be negative.
As explained above, to get more reliable estimates of the demographic composition of plants’
workforces, in the plant-level estimation we define workers’ demographic characteristics more
broadly than is typical for individual-level wage equations. In order to provide direct comparability
between individual-level wage equations and the plant-level equations we discuss below, column (4)
of Table 2 reports the results of the individual-level regression using the more aggregated forms of
‘6Arace-wage gap of this magnitude (7VO) is standard, and suggests that we may be unable to detect significant
differences between blacks and non-blacks in plant-level estimates of wage equations (and production functions).
14these characteristics that we use in the plant-level regressions. The only major qualitative difference
is that the magnitude of the estimated marriage premium almost doubles in size.
Finally, in the plant-level wage and output equations, identification of productivity and wage
differentials associated with demographic characteristics of workers comes from covariation across
plants in the demographic composition of the workforce, and output and earnings. If we find
evidence that, for example, women are paid less than men, the plant-level data do not enable us to
determine whether the lower wages of women come from the segregation of women into low-wage
plants (e.g., Blau, 1977), or lower pay for women than men within plants. We can, however, add a
plant fixed effect to equation (9) to estimate within-~lant wage differentials associated with
demographic characteristics of workers. Estimates of the specification in column (4), including plant
fixed effects, are reported in column (5). Most of the estimated wage differentials (with the
exception of that associated with race) are slightly smaller in absolute value. But the differentials
remain, and the slight reductions indicate that the wage differentials we are studying are largely
within plants .17 Given this, it seems valid to interpret the plant-level wage equation (9) as the plant-
level aggregation of the individual-level wage equations in column (4) of Table 2. In contrast, if the
differentials were largely between plants, we could not confidently interpret our estimates as
measuring differences between demographic groups. In the absence of measures of productivity for
individual workers, we of course cannot test whether estimated productivity differentials also reflect
primarily within-plant differentials; we assume this to be the case.
Moreover, as we show below, the results we obtain from estimating the plant-level wage
equation resemble closely the individual-level fixed-effects results in Table 2. As we illustrate, some
of the differences that do exist are driven by differences in the measurement of wages. Other
‘7 Groshen (1991) finds a larger role for between-plant wage variation in the male-female wage gap. However, her
results are not very comparable to ours: first, she has much finer controls for occupation; second, she studies only five
detailed industries, three of which are not in manufacturing,
15differences may be due to the fact that there is some systematic variation across plants. Nonetheless,
the qualitative results of the fixed-effects estimates in Table 2 nearly always persist in the plant-level
results and, in fact, the point estimates for sex and marriage differentials in the plant-level results are
virtually identical to those in Table 2. Finally, it is important to note that the differences that we do
find between the plant-level and individual-level wage equation estimates do not indicate systematic
biases toward zero in the plant-level estimates. This suggests that measurement error in the estimated
demographic composition of plants’ workforces (which we discuss further below) is not significantly
affecting our results.
VII. Plant-Level Production Function and Wape Eauation Estimates: Basic Results
The basic results of the joint estimation of the wage and productivity equations are reported
in Table 3. In this table, we use LRD wages and salaries to measure earnings. We have more
confidence in this plant-level earnings variable than the variable constructed from Census data,
because the Census earnings data measure wages and salaries earned by the worker from all jobs, not
necessarily the job in the plant to which the worker is matched. In Section VIII, we report results
with Census earnings variables, and report a number of other analyses of the sensitivity of the results
and of potential sources of bias.
There are two caveats to the results we report that should be noted at the outset. First,
although we only have estimates of the percentage of workers in each demographic group, we have
treated the various elements of QL for each plant as known for the purposes of estimation.
Therefore, there may be biases in both the coefficient estimates and the standard errors which we
report here, Note, however, that under the null hypothesis, measurement error in the estimates of the
percentages of workers in each demographic group will affect both the productivity and the wage
equations similarly, and it is the comparison between corresponding coefficients in the two equations
which is of primary interest. In addition, as noted above, the plant-level wage equation estimates
16generally do not differ much from the individual-level estimates, suggesting that the plant-level
estimates are not biased much by measurement error. Below we discuss results from a simulation of
the extent of measurement-error bias, and conclude that our results are robust to this problem.
Second, some of the estimated wage and productivity differentials by occupation and education are
surprising. For example, we typically estimate that the marginal product of managerial/professional
labor is below that of unskilled production labor. This result may arise because our data set covers
production units. Managerial/professional labor may be concentrated at other sites, and the
proportion that happens to be located at the production site may have little to do with output. ]8
However, we also tend to find that the productivity of skilled blue-collar workers (precision
production, crafi, and repair) is below--although not significantly--that of unskilled workers, in the
output specification. We also typically find that productivity differentials by education substantially
exceed wage differentials by education, although we are aware of no theory that predicts this result; it
may be in part related to problems in estimating occupational differentials. However, the results
reported below were completely insensitive to constraining the productivity and wage differentials by
education or occupation to be the same, so whatever problems may plague estimation of the latter
differentials, they do not influence our conclusions.
VII.1 Differentials bv Sex
For both the output and value-added specifications, the estimates of $~ and ~~ are repofied in
the first row of Table 3. The point estimate of the productivity differential, OF, in the output
specification is 0.85, which implies that women are 15°/0less productive than men, a difference that
is significantly different from zero. 19For the value-added specification, the estimate of ~~ is 0.96,
‘EInprinciple, we could compare the results horn the fill sample with those for the subsample of single-plant firms.
The latter, however, constitute only 18% of our plants. Given that some firms have multiple plants in the data set, we may
not have fully accounted for the correlations in the errors of our equations. However, of the 3,102 establishments in our
data set, 1,731 have no matched establishment.
‘gWhenwe do not instrument for materials, the estimate of $, slightly exceeds one (although not significantly).
17and is insignificantly different from one.20
In contrast, the estimates of ~~--the relative wage--are 0.68 and 0.66 in the two specifications
and are both significantly less than one. The p-values from tests of the equality of the wage and
productivity differentials, reported in columns (3) and (6), indicate that for both the output and value-
-added specifications, we reject equality. This implies that, on average, women’s lower wages do not
reflect lower relative marginal products. One interpretation of this finding is that men and women
fill the same jobs in plants, and despite being equally productive, women are paid less, consistent
with the standard wage discrimination hypothesis, Based on the most conservative estimate of the
difference between the sex wage gap and the sex productivity gap (in the output specification),
women are estimated to be 15°/0less productive than men, but are paid 32°/0less, consistent with just
over half of the wage gap being attributable to discrimination.
There are other possible interpretations of this finding, however, some consistent with
discrimination and some not. First, the result may arise because women tend to be employed in
lower-paying jobs or occupations (at a level of detail finer than the occupational breakdown we use),
although these jobs or occupations are not less productive. This could arise because of taste
discrimination as in Becker (1971), coupled with legal impediments to paying unequal wages to men
and women in the same job or occupation. We do not have the detailed occupation and job-level
information with which to address this alternative discrimination hypothesis, nor would we be likely
to be able to address it in the production function context even if we had such data, since it seems
unlikely that we could obtain reliable estimates of productivity differentials across narrow
However, we would expect thereto be upward endogeneity bias in the estimated coefficient of materials, and, given that
there is a fairly strong negative correlation between materials and the percent female, the estimate of $~ would also be
upward biased.
‘“Wehave also estimated the specifications in Table 3 without including controls for capital and materials usage of the
plant in the wage equation. Although these variables are significant in the wage equation, excluding them has almost no
quantitative effect on the other estimated coefficients.
18occupations and jobs. Second, because we are estimating between-plant relationships, another
possibility is that women tend to be employed in lower-paying plants, although these plants are not
much less productive, on average, than other plants. This is not primarily the case, however, because
as column (5) in Table 2 shows, the sex difference in wages in these data arises mostly within plants.
At any rate, in either case we would still conclude that there is a sex gap in wages that does not
reflect a difference in marginal productivity.
Alternatively, the finding that women’s relative wage is below their relative marginal product
may arise if plants vary in the degree to which they have implemented labor-saving technological
change. If such change is not filly accounted for in the book value of capital (and we would not
expect it to be), and if it tends to eliminate production worker jobs which are disproportionately filled
by men, then unobserved technological differences could bias upwards our estimate of $~, because
labor is more productive in plants that have implemented relatively more labor-saving technological
change.” (At the same time, the estimate of ~, would not be biased upwards, if wages are set equal
to opportunity wages in other plants.) We would only expect this problem not to arise if
technological change is capital augmenting, and is correctly captured in capital price deflators. While
these desirable circumstances seem unlikely to hold exactly, Baily, et al. (1992) find that results for
total factor productivity regressions are the same using book value of capital and a more carefilly
constructed capital series based on initial capital stocks and annual investment data. Below, we
examine this question further.
VII.2 BlacWNon-Black Differentials
The second row of Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients in the production function and
*’Forevidence that technological change has reduced the proportion of production worker employment, see Berman, et
al. (1994) and Doms, et al, (1994). We need not assume that the technological change saves on production labor. This
assumption simply provides a more compelling reason to believe that mismeasured technology or capital is correlated
with the percent female,
19wage equation on the percentage of blacks in the plant, and the tests of the equality of these
coefficients. The relative productivity of blacks, ~~, is estimated to be 1.09 in the output
specification and 1.07 in the value-added specification; these estimates are not significantly different
from one. The estimated relative wage is 1.06 and is also not significantly different from one. Not
surprisingly given these estimates, the tests reported in columns (3) and (6) do not reject equality of
relative wages and relative marginal products of black workers.
The plant-level wage results contrast with the individual-level wage regressions reported in
Table 2 (and the commonplace finding), according to which the wage differential between blacks and
non-blacks, while small, is significant and negative. Our estimates of $B and ABare likely biased
upward for two reasons. First, as discussed in Section V, our sample of workers underestimates the
number of blacks working in manufacturing, The under-representation of blacks would cause the
estimate of ABto be biased away from one. Since the estimate of @~is likely to be similarly biased,
however, the test of the equality of the wage and productivity differentials is still valid.22 Second, the
fixed-plant-effects estimates of wage differentials between blacks and non-blacks in the WECD are
smaller than the cross-section differentials, indicating that within plants, blacks earn less than non-
blacks, but that blacks work in slightly higher-paying plants (see also Barrington and Troske, 1994).
This suggests that the production finction and wage equation estimates--which use across-plant
variation--mask lower relative wages paid to blacks. Nonetheless, our results should be biased
towards finding no evidence of discrimination only if blacks tend to work in plants that pay relatively
higher wages, but in which productivity is not relatively higher. Given that we cannot measure
within-plant productivity differentials between workers, all we can conclude is that our results from
the between-plant estimates are not consistent with discrimination against black workers. This
‘zStrictly speaking, this is true under the null hypothesis that $B=AB,as explained in HNa. Because, white, male, and
married workers are overrepresented in the WECD, the same argument may apply to the estimated ~’s and A’sfor women
and marital status,
20conclusion, however, may be premature, as the within-plant productivity differentials between blacks
and non-blacks cannot be explored with these data.
As shown in the third row of Table 3, the estimated productivity of workers aged 35-54
(prime-aged workers) relative to younger workers is 0.98 in the output specification md 1.16 in the
value-added specification. Neither estimate is significantly different from one, indicating that the
results are consistent with a flat productivity profile through this age range. The results from the
wage equation indicate that prime-aged workers are paid 8-9°/0more than younger workers, and
although this differential is statistically significant, the p-values from tests of the equality of the wage
and productivity differentials are 0.22 and 0.54, and hence we do not reject the equality of the
differentials.
In contrast, the results for workers aged 55 and over, shown in the fourth row, provide more
compelling evidence that wage growth exceeds productivity growth. In the output specification, the
results indicate that older workers are significantly less productive than younger workers, with their
relative marginal productivity estimated to be 0.75. In the value-added specification, this estimate is
0.89, not significantly below one. In both specifications, the wages of workers aged 55 and over are
significantly higher than the wages of younger workers, with estimates of 1.09 to 1.11. In the output
specification we reject equality of the relative marginal products and wages of older workers, with a
p-value of effectively zero. In the value-added specification the evidence is weaker, with a p-value of
0.13,23
“We alsoexaminedresultsusingtheproportionsof workersin fiveagegroups(<25, 25-34, 35-44,45-54, and55
andover). The estimatesrevealedno significantevidenceagainsta flatproductivityprofilethroughage54, and, as in
theearlierresults, significantlylowerproductivityof workersaged55 andover. Onthe otherhand, the estimates
revealsignificantlyhigherwagesfor all groupsof workersaged25 andover, relativeto the youngestgroup, andlittle
differenceamongthesegroups(althoughthe estimatesare not inconsistentwith a quadraticearningsprofile). Finally,
thehypothesistests indicatedthatthe wagepremiumfor all groupsof workersaged25 andover significantlyexceeds
anyproductivitydifferential. Thus, theseresultsparallelthosein Table3, exceptthatthe evidencefor workersaged
35-54is somewhatstronger. Notethatwe areestimatingrelativewageandmarginalproductivityprofiles;thus,our
21VII 4 The Marriape Premium
In Table 3, the estimated wage differential associated with marriage is approximately 26%
and is statistically significant. The productivity differential is estimated to be somewhat higher, at
29% or 58% depending on the specification, and both estimates are statistically significant. The p-
value for the test of the equality of the wage and productivity marriage premia is 0.76 in the output
specification, and 0.22 in the value-added specification. These findings imply that married workers
are compensated for being more productive than unmarried workers. The fact that the marriage wage
premium reflects an underlying productivity premium suggests that the premium is not attributable to
discrimination in favor of married workers, but is instead consistent with married workers being
more productive--whether because of selection or a true productivity effect (see Korenman and
Neumark, 1991).
VIII. Analvsis of Robustness and Potential Biases
We now turn to numerous analyses of the robustness of the results reported in the previous
section, and of potential sources of bias. To some extent we focus on sex differentials in relative
wages and marginal products, since these results are likely to be most controversial. Accordingly, we
also focus on the output specification, which yields a more conservative estimate of the evidence
consistent with discrimination against women.24
VIII 1 Alternative Wape Measures
First, in Panel A of Table 4 we report translog output results using the alternative wage
measures .25 As shown in the first row of the table, the estimate of ~~ is stable, ranging from 0.84 to
results do not necessarily imply that older workers are paid more than their marginal product.
241n general, results for the analyses that follow were qualitatively similar for the value-added specification.
‘sAnnual total wage and salary information reported by the plant in the LRD corresponds very closely to annual total
wage and salary information in the plant estimated from the worker data, with similar means and a correlation of 0.98.
220.86. The estimated earnings differential (AF)is similar using LRD compensation instead of wages
and salaries. Using the Census earnings measure, the estimate of AFdrops to 0.57. One reason for
the lower estimate of IF may be that women are less likely to report earnings from more than one job.
The results for black workers are consistent across the different wage measures, as are the results for
marriage differentials in wages and productivity.
The estimated life-cycle profiles in Table 4 using the alternative earnings measure from the
Census indicate that wages rise significantly faster than productivity (which is estimated to have a
flat age profile). Using LRD compensation, the p-values for equality of relative marginal products
and wages are 0.09 for prime-aged workers, and effectively zero for older workers. Using Census
wages and salaries, the p-values are effectively zero for both age groups. The estimated wage growth
in the Census may be upward biased, however, if prime-age workers are more likely to report
earnings from more than one job. Nonetheless, the combined evidence in Table 4 for life-cycle wage
and productivity profiles suggests that wage profiles are steeper than productivity profiles.
VIII. 2 Hours-Weighted Estimates
To this point, the percentages of labor input from each demographic group were estimated
from the percentages of workers in each demographic group in the sample of workers matched to
each plant. We now report results in which we instead compute these percentages based on hours
worked, calculated from weeks worked and usual hours worked per week as reported in the
Census. As for the Census earnings measure, these data are problematic because hours worked do
not necessarily correspond to hours worked solely at the matched establishment. On the other
hand, it is desirable to try to incorporate hours information to avoid systematic biases in the
estimates of the @‘s and the k‘s. For example, if women work fewer hours on average (for a
single employer) than do men, then the estimates of & and AFwill be downward biased.
23The specification reported in Panel B of Table 4 is the hours-weighted counterpart to that in
columns (l)-(3) of Table 3. The estimates of& and AFboth rise by 0.11, to 0.96 and 0.79,
respectively. Similarly, the estimates of& and AR(the parameters for married workers) fall by
roughly the same amount, presumably reflecting the greater hours worked by married men. The
other estimated $‘s and A‘s change by less, but, as we would expect, always change in the same
direction for a particular demographic characteristic. The similar changes in the estimates of the
corresponding @‘s and A‘s confirm our general presumption that mismeasured variables may bias
estimates of the $‘s and the A‘s, but are much less likely to bias estimates of the differences
between them. As a result, the qualitative conclusions in Table 4 are the same as those in Table 3.
We still find that the sex gap in wages significantly exceeds the productivity gap, that older
workers receive relative wages in excess of their relative marginal products, and that there is
evidence consistent with discrimination against blacks, or in favor of ever-married workers.
VIII 3 Relaxinp the Eauiurovortionate and Eaual Relative Productivity Restrictions
no
The way that labor enters the production function and the wage equation to this point is
restrictive in two senses. First, the relative marginal productivities (wages) of two types of workers
within one demographic group are restricted to equal the relative marginal productivities (wages) of
those types of workers within another demographic group. Second, the proportion of workers
defined by one demographic group is restricted to be constant across all other groups.
In Panels A and B of Table 5 we relax certain aspects of these restrictions. To explain how
we do this, we discuss the methods and results underlying Panel A of Table 5 in detail, before going
onto the other results in the table, In Panel A, we relax both types of restrictions with regard to
marriage, race, and sex, based on evidence that the marriage wage premium for men does not carry
over to women, and that the race differential is larger for men than for women (e.g., Corcoran and
24Duncan, 1979). These race andsexdifferences inwages suggest that itisofinterest torelax the
restriction of equal relative marginal products that we imposed on QL, to see if similar patterns are
detectable with respect to productivity differentials. In the production function, this yields a quality
of labor term of the form:
QL=(L+(@F-l)WFS +($, -l) WMR+(@B-l)BMS+( $,”~B-l)BMR
+(@~”@F-@FI~ -l)W~R +(@F”@B”@FxB -l)~~~+(@F”@B”@~”@Fx~’@FIB -l)B~R)
(12)
(l+(oG-l);)(l +(@p-l):+(oo-l) ;(l+($N-l):+(o, -l):+ ($c-l)~!
where WFS denotes the number of non-black, never-man-ied females in the firm, WMR the number of
non-black married males, BMS the number of black, never-married males, etc. Introducing these
variables relaxes the equiproportionate restriction regarding the distribution of workers. The term
@,m is the coefficient on the interaction for being female and married. A finding that @,m=l would
indicate that the marriage productivity premium for women is no different than that for men. The
term ~~m is the interaction coefficient for black females, where $~m=l would imply that the
productivity differential between men and women does not vary by race. We similarly augment the
wage equation to incorporate these interaction terms. Introducing these parameters relaxes the equal
relative productivityy restriction,zb
We first estimate the unrestricted model, using the expression for QL in equation (12) and the
corresponding term in the wage equation. We then test which of the “interaction” coefficients (such
as @~~ are significantly different from one, and reestimated the equations retaining only these; if
either the productivity or wage interaction is significant, we retain both of them for the corresponding
demographic characteristic. We report the latter (restricted) set of estimates. However, in the table
we always use the disaggregated estimates of the distribution of workers (WFS, WMR, etc.).
260neway to see that the formulation in equation (12) is correct is to impose this restriction on the parameters, impose
the equiproportionate assumption on the data (e.g., WMR = (R/L).(1 - {F/L})”(l - {B/L})), and note that the original
quali~ of labor term in equation (8) results.
25For neither wages nor productivity were any of the estimated interaction coefficients
significantly different from one. We therefore report the filly restricted model, but without imposing
the equiproportionate restriction on the data.27 The estimates and test results closely parallel the
corresponding estimates in Table 3. Thus, the imposition in Table 3 of the equiproportionate
assumption on the data--at least for the demographic categories that we have considered here--has
little or no effect on the estimates,
In Panel B we carry out a similar exercise, but relax the restrictions with regard to sex and
occupation, allowing the proportion of the workforce in each occupation to vary by sex, and wage
and productivity differentials to vary by sex across occupations. Our primary interest is in the
sensitivity of estimated wage and productivity differentials by sex to these restrictions--especially the
restriction that the occupational distribution by sex is the same.
In the unrestricted model, only the interactions for managerial/professional workers and
technical, sales, etc., workers were significant, so the specification retaining these is reported in Panel
B, In this case, the coefficients for female in the top panel refer to unskilled workers (operators,
fabricators, and laborers) and precision production, crafi, and repair workers. Among these workers,
the relative wage of women is less than their relative marginal productivity (0.64 vs. 0.77), and the
estimates are significantly different from each other (p-value = 0.03). The last two rows of the panel
report sex differences in wages and productivity for the other two occupational categories .28 The sex
gap in wages exceeds that in productivity (significantly) for technical, sales, etc., workers, but for
managerial/professional workers, the opposite is true, although the difference between the sex gap in
wages and in productivity is insignificant. The extra information that we obtain from Panel B of
27Manipulation ofthe equationsinfootnote8 showsthatthis leadsto a differentspecificationfromthefully-restricted
version.
26We obtainthesebymultiplyingtheparameterestimatesforthereferencegroupbythe estimatedinteraction
parameters. For example, the marginal productivity of managerial/professional women (relative to
managerial/professional men) is 0.77 x 0.87 = 0.67.
26Table 5, then, is that the evidence consistent with sex discrimination comes from the non-managerial
and non-professional occupations, in which 86°/0of the women in the sample work.
VIII 4 Relaxing the Pe<kct Substitutes Assum~tion
We next consider estimates of a production function in which workers are imperfect rather
than perfect substitutes. It seems to us most natural to separate labor inputs along occupational lines.
We therefore estimate a production function of the form
(13) In(Y) = ln(~) +~ln(K) +~ln(M) +yPln(QLP) + yNPln(QLNP) + g(K,M, QLP, QLNP) + P,
where the subscripts ‘P’and ‘NP’denote production and non-production workers, respectively, and
g(K,M, QLr, QL~p) represents the higher-order terms in the translog production function.29 The QL
terms in equation(13) are of the same form as equation (8), but defined for the two subsets of
workers. The wage equation is of the same form as equation (9), except that production and non-
production workers (in each demographic group) are broken out separately. We assume that the $’s
and A’sare the same for both types of workers, which permits us to focus on the effects of relaxing
the perfect substitutes assumption.30 In interpreting these results, recall our earlier caveat that
estimates for non-production workers may be problematic because the sample of plants includes
production units only. Nonetheless, the evidence indicates that the specification of the labor input in
terms of perfect vs. imperfect substitutes does not affect the results; the estimates reported in Panel C
of Table 5 lead to very similar conclusions to those for the perfect substitutes specification.3’
‘gProduction workersincludethetwoblue-collaroccupations,andnon-productionworkersincludethe othertwo
occupations, Withthis formoftheproductionfunction,outputiszeroforanyplantswithoutworkersin anoccupation
category. Wehadto drop219plantswitheitherno productionworkersorno non-productionworkersinthematched
sampleofworkers. Hadweenteredall fouroccupationsasimperfectlysubstitutablelaborinputs,wewouldhavehadto
dropmanymoreobservations.
301n estimatesrelaxingthis assumption,theonlyqualitativedifferencewasthatordyfor productionworkers (andonly
for olderworkers)was theresignificantevidencethatwagesrise fasterthanproductivity.
3’Infact,the estimatesalsochangeslightlybecausethe sampleis smaller. Whenweestimatedtheperfectsubstitutes
outputspecificationonthis sample,allofthe statisticalconclusionswere the same. However, the relative marginal
27VIII.5 Results<for SubsamA~les ofthe Data
The WECD only contains information on a cross-section of workers from 1990. Because of
this, we are unable to account formally (say, through a fixed-effects analysis) for differences across
plants in unobservable that maybe correlated with the demographic characteristics of a plant. If
these unobservable plant-level characteristics affect both the productivity of the plant and the wages
that the plant pays (which would occur if labor markets are segmented along the dimension of these
unobservable), then, as we argue above, we would expect the omission of these plant-level
characteristics to bias in the same way both our estimates of productivity differences and wage
differences so as not to negate our test of the equality of the two differentials. If, however, these
plant-level characteristics solely affect the productivity of the plant but do not affect wages, then we
have reason to worry that only our estimated productivity differentials are biased. While we cannot
account for all unobservable plant-level differences, in this section we try to get a sense of the
magnitude of this problem by breaking up the sample along dimensions in which we think plants may
differ. By doing this, we account for at least some differences across plants that maybe related to
their demographic composition. In the next section, we look at additional evidence on the role of
unobservable.
Durables and Nondurable
In Panel A of Table 6, we split the sample into those plants producing durable goods and
those producing nondurable goods. This division is informative because women tend to work in
plants that produce nondurable goods, such as textiles, and because the percent female in a plant is
negatively correlated with the use of materials in that plant. These considerations suggest that
product of women was noticeably higher (0.94 vs. 0.85 in Table 3), as was the relative marginal product of married
workers (1.50 vs. 1.29 in Table 3).
28women may tend to work in industries with production technologies different from those in which
men work.
The results for both durable- and nondurable-producing plants are similar to the full-sample
results. The estimates of the sex differential in productivity suggest that women may be less
productive, especially in nondurable. But the estimated wage gaps (40Y0in nondurable, and 32V0
in durables) are both significantly larger than the productivity gaps, consistent with sex
discrimination. The results for the other coefficients are consistent with the full-sample results,
although the estimates are less precise. The results for the tests of the equality of the productivity and
wage differentials are unchanged, with older workers earning relative wages that exceed their relative
marginal products.
Percent Female
In Panel B of Table 6, we divide the sample into plants with above- and below-median
percentages female in the workforce, for three reasons. First, the nature or extent of sex
discrimination may differ in plants with varying proportions of female workers. Second, women may
work disproportionately in plants with technologies different from plants which employ mostly men.
Finally, we can help address the argument that labor-saving technology biases upward the estimate of
$,, which we return to below. If our previous estimates of $, were biased upward because of
variation across plants in labor-saving technology coupled with positive covariation between such
technology and the percent female, then when we split the sample into plants with relatively higher or
lower percentages of women, the estimate of $~ should fall, as we effectively condition on this
technology.
The results are different for the two subsamples. First, in the predominantly female plants
women are estimated to be 210/0less productive than men and to be paid 26°/0percent less. These
differentials are not significantly different from each other, consistent with no sex discrimination. In
29the predominantly male plants, the estimated productivity differential falls to 1‘A, although the wage
differential stays large at 28%. There is a large standard error on the productivity differential,
however, so that even though the gap between the point estimates of the relative productivity and
wage is 27°/0, we cannot formally reject the equality of the two. The results therefore indicate that the
extent of sex discrimination is lower in plants with large numbers of women, and that this finding is
driven by differences in relative productivity, not in relative wages. With regard to biases from
labor-saving technological change, we do not find that the estimate of $~ falls in both subsamples;
moreover, it actually rises in plants with fewer women, casting doubt on this interpretation of our
findings .32
Em~lovment Levels
Finally, we disaggregate the plants into those with employment levels above and below the
median. These results may provide some indication of possible differences in the extent of
discrimination between large and small plants. In addition, because the division of plants by
employment levels corresponds closely to the division of plants based on number of workers matched
to a plant, these results give us some sense of the effect that measurement error in the percentage of
workers in each demographic category may have on our results. That is, we match large numbers of
workers to large plants but few workers to small plants, so that measurement error should be less
problematic in large plants.
The estimated degree of discrimination against women (measured by the estimate of $~ - ~,)
is smaller in the smaller plants (16°/0versus 430/0). These results suggest that smaller firms are less
able to indulge in sex discrimination, which may be in part because they have less market power
32 Splitting up the sample into industries (as opposed to plants) with high and low percentages of women produces
results that more strongly point to differences between plants in the degree of sex discrimination. Specifically, in
industries with below-median percent female, there is no estimated productivity gap, but the estimated wage gap is 38°/0
and statistically significantly different from the productivity estimate. For industries with above-median percent female,
there is no statistically significant difference between the sex wage and productivity gap.
30(Becker, 1971). As with the results for the subsamples broken out by percent female, this is driven
by differences in relative productivities between men and women rather than differences in relative
wages. In addition, in the smaller plants there is now marginally significant evidence that prime-age
males (aged 35-54) are paid in excess of their relative marginal product. Overall, though, the other
qualitative conclusions are similar for the large and small plants. In addition, we do not find that
estimates of the $’s and l’s are consistently closer to one in the sample of small plants, as
measurement error might lead us to expect (in the absence of other differences in parameters between
large and small plants).
VIII 6 Biases from Labor-Savin~ Technical Innovation
We next examine evidence on whether biases from unmeasured labor-saving technical
change can explain why we find that the relative pay of women falls short of their relative marginal
product. For a subset of industries we have independent information on technological innovation
from the Census Bureau’s 1988 Survey of Manufacturing Technology (see Doms, et al., 1994), This
survey covered over 10,000 establishments in SIC industries 34-38 (which are high-technology
industries). Over 350 establishments in the WECD can be matched to establishments in this survey.
The matched establishments can be used to ask whether the use of advanced technologies is in fact
associated with lower percentages of production workers, and whether, for those technologies that
appear to replace production workers, there also tends to be a higher percent female.
The results are reported in Table 7. Panel A first reports the percent production workers and
percent female, for plants that did and did not use each of the advanced technologies indicated. Panel
B reports summary findings. The first finding is that there is no evidence that these advanced
technologies are associated with fewer production workers; Panel B shows that just over half (nine)
of the technologies are associated with a lower percentage of production workers. We also find that
the percent female tends to be lower, rather than higher, in plants using the advanced technologies.
31As Panel B shows, of those technologies associated with a lower percentage of production workers,
seven are associated with a lower percent female, and only one is associated with a higher percent
female. Moreover, only two of the advanced technologies are associated with a higher percent
female. Thus, for this subset of industries at least, there is no evidence suggesting that the estimated
relative marginal productivity of women is biased upward because the percent female tends to be
higher in plants that have installed technology that saves on male production labor, or on male labor
generally .33
VIII 7 Measurement Error
Although we only have estimates of the percentage of workers in each demographic group in
each plant, until now we have treated these percentages as known for the purposes of estimation. In
this section, we explore more
estimating these percentages.
fully the potential effects of measurement error that arises from
It should be noted that measurement error in the estimates of the
percentage of workers in each demographic group will affect both the wage and productivity
equations, and it is the comparison between corresponding coefficients in the two equations that is of
primary interest. Nonetheless, to the extent that productivity differentials across workers may be of
independent interest, and to the extent that measurement error may under some circumstances bias
coefficients different y in the wage and productivity equations, it is an issue that merits consideration.
We have already discussed two types of indirect evidence suggesting that measurement error
is not causing large biases in our results: first, the results from the individual-level wage equations in
Table 2 do not differ greatly from the plant-level wage equation results in Table 3; and second, the
“The readermightwonderwhetherthe relativelylowestimatesofthe marginalproductivityofolderworkersinthe
precedingtablesstemfromanegativeassociationbetweentheuseof advancedtechnologiesandtheproportionof
workersaged55 andover,perhapsbecausedecliningplantsdonotupdatetheirtechnologiesanddonothire asmanynew
workersasotherplants. However,theproportionofworkersaged55andoverwasvirtuallythe sameforplantsthat did
ordidnot use eachofthetechnologieslistedinTable7. For 13 of the 17 technologies these proportions were equal (to
two digits), and the proportions never differed by more than .02. Thus, our estimates of lower productivity of older
workers do not appear to be attributable to the association of less-advanced technologies with high proportions of older
workers.
32results do not differ greatly when we break the sample into large and small plants. In this section, we
quantify the magnitudes of measurement error biases with a Monte Carlo simulation.34
Consider the production fanction and wage equations given by equations (6), (8), and (9).35
From the data, we know the true values of Y,K, M, and L for each plant. All of the remaining
variables (F/L, WL, etc.) are estimated from the sample of T workers within each plant. We simulate
the effects of measurement error by creating a synthetic workforce of L workers for each plant. We
do this by creating L/T (rounded to the nearest integer) synthetic workers for each of the T workers in
the sample. With this new synthetic workforce of L workers, we sample randomly without
replacement T workers, and use this simulated sample to estimate the proportions of workers in each
demographic group.3G Finally, we use these simulated estimates of these proportions to jointly
estimate the production function and wage specifications in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, obtaining
new estimates of the productivity and wage differentials (the $’s and A’s)across demographic groups,
We repeat this process 1000 times, yielding 1000 different values for each of the ~’s and k’s. This
procedure enables us to assess the impact on our results of measurement error in the estimated
proportions of workers in each demographic group, by comparing model estimates based on the
simulated data to model estimates based on the WECD data, which we treat as true. In other words,
we assess the impact of measurement error on the estimated $’s and A’sby adding sampling error to
34A1though weknowthenumberofworkerssampledineachplant,wedonot implementaformalcorrectionforthe
measurementerrorbiasthatresultsfromsamplingerror. Thiscorrectionwouldrequirea consistentestimateofthe
varianceofthe measurementerror,whichvariesby plantdependingonthetrueproportionofworkersin any particular
catego~, (For example, at one extreme, in a plant with no female workers the variance of the measurement error in the
proportion female is zero,) In other contexts, measurement-error corrections of this type (with non-homogeneous error
variances across observations) result in near-singular covariance matrices, because of a high ratio of error variance to total
variance (Cockbum and Griliches, 1987).
351n this section we do not estimate a separate coefficient for blacks versus non-blacks. The simulation requires
repeated sampling of workers within a plant, and there are too few blacks in the sample to successfully estimate a race
coefficient for many of the simulations.
3GFor example, suppose in the WECD we have four men and six women matched to a plant (T=l O),and we know from
the LRD that there are 100 workers in the plant (L=1OO).We then create a simulated sample of forty men (four x 100/1 O)
and sixty women (six x 100/1O). Finally, we sample 10members of this sample, and obtain a new estimate of the
proportion female.
33the estimated proportions of workers in each demographic group, and re-estimating these
parameters.37
Summary results of the 1000 simulations are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8, and
can be compared to the results from Table 3 (repeated in columns (1) and (2)) to assess the
magnitude of the biases caused by estimating the demographic proportions. The results indicate
measurement error biases that, as expected, pull the estimated coefficients toward one, and are
greater in magnitude the farther fi-om one is the true value. For example, the mean estimate of ~~ in
the simulations is 0.89, and the estimate using the actual data is 0.85; the mean estimate of AFin the
simulations is 0.75, and the estimate using the actual data is 0.68. These results show that the effect
of measurement error is to bias us toward finding no discemable productivity or wage differentials
across workers, and toward finding no differences between the relative productivity and wage
estimates for a given type of worker (since estimates of parameters that are further from one have
larger absolute biases toward one). Thus, the power of the tests of the equality of wage and
productivity differentials is somewhat reduced because of measurement error.
We therefore conclude from the simulation that our earlier estimates indicating significant
estimated gaps between relative wages and productivity for women and older workers are robust to
the measurement error problem. On the other hand, we consistently found evidence of the equality of
relative wage and productivity premia for married workers, using the actual data. However, the
closeness of the point estimates of these premia, the relatively large estimated standard error of the
productivity premium, and the similarity between the distributions of the simulated estimates for the
wage and productivity premia in Table 8, lead us to believe that even in the absence of measurement
“Because the estimated proportions of workers in each category that we treat as known for our simulation are
overdispersed relative to the true population distribution, the extent of measurement error bias indicated by our simulation
method is a lower bound for the magnitude of measurement error in the real data.
34error, we would still find no significant difference between the wage and productivity premia for
married workers.3 g
IX. Conclusions
This paper uses individual-level data on workers matched with plant-level data on inputs,
output and earnings, to estimate the relative wages and relative marginal products of workers with
different demographic characteristics, We use a production function approach to plants’
technologies, and a simple model of the wage structure of each plant, coupled with a unique data set
matching workers and employers. We interpret the results in the context of numerous issues
regarding the determination of wage differences between demographic groups, which have previously
been addressed based largely on individual-level wage regressions, in the absence of evidence on
productivity.
Our basic results indicate that for certain groups of workers, wage differentials do, in fact,
match productivity differentials, while for others they do not. Workers who have ever been married
are paid more than never-married workers and the wage premium they receive reflects a
corresponding productivity premium. This suggests that the marriage premium does not simply
reflect discrimination against unmarried workers, but reflects actual productivityy differences.
However, our data do not distinguish between the hypothesis that marriage reflects an unobservable
variable associated with higher wages, and the hypothesis that marriage makes workers more
productive.
We find that prime-aged workers (aged 35-54) are equally as productive as their younger
counterparts, but in some specifications, the relative wage is significantly higher than any estimated
‘*Thedistribution of the productivity premium bounds that of the wage premium. Below the median, the productivity
premium is slightly below the wage premium; above the median, the productivity premium is greater than the wage
premium. The magnitude of the estimated standard error on the marriage productivity premium in Table 3 alone suggests
that measurement error would have to be reducing the gap between the wage and productivity premia by a factor of seven
before we would reject equality of the wage and productivity marriage premia.
35relative productivity differentials. Results for older workers (aged 55 and over) are more robust, with
the evidence generally indicating a wage premium that exceeds any estimated productivity
differential (which is, in fact, sometimes significantly negative). This evidence is probably most
consistent with Lazear’s (1979) explanation of rising earnings over the life cycle.
We consistently find no evidence consistent with discrimination against blacks in
manufacturing, in the fill-sample as well as the disaggregated results. In addition, there does not
appear to be any productivity differential between blacks and non-blacks which might be attributable
to pre-market discrimination or other unobserved characteristics, although we are less confident in
our separate estimates of the race gap in wages and the race gap in productivity than in our estimates
of the difference between them.
Finally, in nearly all of our specifications and samples we find that women are paid
significantly less than men, with the wage differential between men and women generally estimated
at about 25-3 5°/0,depending on the wage measure we use. The productivity differentials between
men and women are less robust. The most conservative translog estimates indicate that women may
be as much as 15V0less productive than men, although this differential may reflect differences in
hours worked, Regardless of this, across of a wide variety of analyses the sex wage gap is
significantly larger than the sex productivity gap, consistent with sex discrimination. There are only
two exceptions. First, for plants with a large proportion of female workers, we estimate that women
are less productive and are paid less, but we do not find a wage gap that is much larger than the
productivity gap. Second, we do not find evidence consistent with sex discrimination in wages for
managerial/professional workers.
As we discuss above, we cannot filly account for unobserved plant-specific differences that
are correlated with the quality of workers. If these omitted plant-specific factors affect productivity
but not wages (or vice-versa), our tests of the equality of relative wages and relative productivities
36may be biased. We have examined this problem as fully as we can within the context of our cross-
sectional data, however, and have not found much evidence that supports this. In particular, our
conclusion that the sex wage gap is significantly larger than the sex productivity gap in many plants
and for most occupations will only be overturned by compelling evidence from other data that
women are systematically working in less-productive (but not lower-paying) plants.
We have interpreted the results presented herein a structural framework, in which the
estimates from the production function represent relative marginal products of workers and the
estimates from the wage equation represent relative wages. We readily acknowledge that the results
can interpreted in a less structural manner, as comparing average productivity differentials across
plants to average wage differentials, and relating these differences to the characteristics of the
workers in those plants. Even with this interpretation, this research still teaches us considerably more
than what we can learn solely from individual-level wage regressions. Finally, under either
interpretation of our estimates, our results suggest many important avenues for fature research--using
the WECD--on the variation of wages and productivity across workers both within and between
establishments.
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hg value added ($1,000)
hg capital ($1,000)
Log cost of materials ($1,000)
bg wages and salaries ($1,000)













Food products and tobacco products
Textile mill products, apparel, and leather
and leather products
Lumber and wood products and furniture
fixtures
Paper and allied products and printing
and publishing
















Census of Population Data




Proportion of LRD employment matched 0.12
Proportion with 2-5 workers matched
Proportion with 6-10 workers matched
Proportion with 11-20 workers matched
Proportion with 21-40 workers matched






















Aged 34 or less
Aged 35-54
















There are 3,102 establishment-level observations, and 128,460 matched individuals from the Census. The sample is restricted to those establishments
with total employment of 20 or more, for which at least 5% of employees are matchedTable 2
Individual-Level Census bg Wage/Earnings Regressions
Specifications with Usual Individual- Specifications with Variables Fixed




















































































































































Specifications with Usual Individual- Specifications with Variables Fixed
~ Used in Plant-hvel Analvsis Plant Effects
Log wage Log earnings Log earnings Log earnings Log earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
.. .. -0.05 ... ..
(0,002)
... ... 0.07 0.06
(0,002) (0.002)




Industry (two-digit) Yes Yes Yes No
Industry (13)
. .
No No No Yes
Establishment size (4)
,..
No No No Yes
Establishment age (4)
..
No No Yes Yes ..
R’ 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.42 . .
Standard errors of the estimates are reported in parentheses. The sample size is 128,460. The sample includes all individuals matched to the
establishments used in the analysis in the following tables. Less than high-school diploma is the omitted education category.Table 3
Joint Production Function and Wage Equation Estimates: Translog Output and Value-Added Production Functions,
Using LRD Wages and Salaries




































































































































































Standard errors of the estimates are reported in parentheses. The sample size is 3,102. Estimates of tbe intercept are not reported. Test statistics
are from Wald tests. The excluded occupation is operators, fabricators, and laborers. Other control variables included in the production function
are: industries (13); size (4 categories); region (4); and establishment part of multi-plant firm. Other control variables included in the wage
equation are: industries (13); size (4 categories); region (4); and age of plant (4). These control variables were selected by estimating the
production function and wage equation jointly without the demographic controls, and retaining those sets of control variables that were jointly
significant at the one-percent level. For the output specification, we instrument with log materials in 1989 with log materials in 1987. The model
is estimated with the data transformed so that output is homogeneous of degree S in the inputs, where S is the sum of tbe coefficients of the linear
terms for the production function inputs. For variables that enter linearly, we use deviations from the means. For variables that enter nonlinearly,
we first estimate the model using the data in levels, and then take deviations from the means of the nonlinear terms. This two-step procedure is
valid because the estimated coefficients of all of the nonlinear terms are invariant to the deviations from the mean transformation.Table 4
Joint Production Function and Wage Equation Estimates: Translog Value-Added Production Function,
Using LRD Compensation Costs and Census Wages and Salaries, and Weighting by Hours,
Estimated Coefficients of Demographic Characteristics
LRD Compensation Costs
p-value,
Loz(outr)ut) ~ CO1. (1)= CO1, (2)
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.84 0.67 0.02
(0.05) (0.02)
Black 1.09 1.05 0.74
(0,11) (0.04)
Aged 35-54 0.97 1.11 0.09
(0,07) (0,03)
Aged 55+ 0.76 1.15 0.00
(0.09) (0.05)
Ever married 1.30 1.29 0.95
(0.14) (0.05)
B. Weiehtine bv Hours
bg(wages and
Census Waees and Salaries
Log(wages and p-value,













Loe(outDuo ‘ti Col.il) =Col (2)
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.96 0.79 0.00
(0.06) (0.02)
Black 1.10 1.10 0,96
(0.12) (0.04)
Aged 35-54 0.97 1.07 0.17
(0.07) (0.03)
Aged 55+ 0.77 1.14 0.00
(0.10) (0,04)
Ever married 1.13 1.11 0.92
(o.12) (0,04)

















Joint Production Function and Wage Equation Estimates: Traoslog Value-Added Production Function,













A, Norrdurables and Durables
Nondurable (N= 1694]
Log(wages and p-value,



































~) Plants At or Below Median Percent Female (N= 1594)
0.79 0,74 0.59 0.99 0,72 0.24
(o.10) (0,03) (0.22) (0.07)
1.27 1.06 0.27 0.74 1.03
(0,17) (0.06) (0.16) (0.06)
0.89 1.05 0.19 1,05 1.07
(0.11) (0.05) (0,10) (0.04)
0.83 1.07 0.16 0.65 1.11
(0.15) (0.07) (0.13) (0.05)
1.63 1.29 0,27 1.07 1.18
(0,31) (0.08) (0,15) (0.06)
C. High and Low Employment
Below Median [166) Emulovment (N= 1551) Above Median Emulovment (N= 1551)
0,78 0,62 0.00 1.06 0,63
(0.05) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02)
1.10 1.06 0.73 0.82 1.06
(0.11) (0.04) (0,16) (0.06)
0,98 1.10 0.08 1.11 1.30
(0.07) (0.03) (0,17) (0.07)
0.78 1.13 0.00 0,58 1.24
(0.09) (0.05) (0.20) (0.09)
1,31 1.27 0,78 1.25 1.54










See footnotes to Table 3 for details.Table 7
Evidence on Percent Production Workers and Percent Female, Based on Technology Use
Uses technolo~v Does not use technolo~v
Y. Production 9. female o ~roduction y. female








Automatic storage and retrieval system
Automatic guided vehicle system




Pick and place robots
Other robots





LAN for technical data







































Number of technologies for which percent female* for plants using technology:
Number of technologies for which percent female - for plants using technology:
Number of technologies associated with lower percent production workers:
Of these, number of technologies for which percent female w for plants using technology:








































Data come from 1988 Survey of Manufacturing Technology, in the following 2-digit SIC industries: fabricated metal products,
industrial machinery and equipment, electronic and other electric equipment, transportation equipment, and instruments and
related products. The survey covers 10,526 establishments, 358 of which are in our sample. In Panel A, technologies that are















































~eestimated productiviV mdwagedifferentials incolums (l)md(2) are from Table 3,colum(l)md (2). The
standard errors of the estimates, and the standard deviations of the simulated values, are reported in parentheses.